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A Constitutional Welfare State
Greg Weiner
When RepResentative paul Ryan unveiled his long-awaited anti-poverty agenda as part of his “Better Way” initiative last June, 
he expressed what were, to conservatives, familiar misgivings about the 
welfare state. It was expensive. It was bureaucratically complex. It had 
failed to conquer poverty. Yet the report also took as a given that “repair-
ing the nation’s safety net” in order to “cure poverty and prevent it” was 
the responsibility of the federal government. In a significant sense, one 
could say Franklin Roosevelt had won: Even conservatives were arguing 
about the best way to fulfill the national government’s responsibility for 
the material well-being of the populace, but not about whether it bore that 
responsibility in the first place. Yet, at least theoretically, many conserva-
tives would revolt at hearing the idea so starkly expressed. That tension 
between theoretical concerns about the welfare state and, in practice, an 
acceptance — even embrace — of its broad contours and basic premises 
haunts conservative attitudes toward the New Deal and its legacy.
The tension is nowhere thicker than in constitutional theory. Orthodox 
constitutionalists almost universally agree that the New Deal derailed the 
regime the framers designed in Philadelphia in 1787. The eruption of leg-
islative activity in Roosevelt’s first 100 days in office — eventually blessed 
by the Supreme Court in the equally furious outbreak of judicial activity 
beginning with West Coast Hotel v. Parrish in 1937 — is widely assumed to 
form a partition separating a long period of limited national government 
from one of concentrated central authority.
Yet for all the hand-wringing, it is not only the policy arrangements 
of the New Deal, such as Social Security, that are going unchallenged. 
The constitutional ones are, too. The period’s judicial pillars stand 
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basically undisturbed to this day. Wickard v. Filburn is notorious among 
conservatives for having stretched the commerce clause so far that it al-
lowed the federal government to regulate the wheat a farmer grew for 
his own family’s consumption, on the grounds that he would otherwise 
have bought it in the interstate market. Yet even the conservative justices 
who dissented with such force from NFIB v. Sebelius’s upholding of the 
Affordable Care Act accused the law of exceeding Wickard’s framework. 
They declined to question the framework itself.
This persistent tension lies partly in a confusion of two elements of 
the New Deal that are often treated as interchangeable but that can, 
in fact, be separated: its administrative and ameliorative premises. The 
administrative premises deal with the regulatory authority over details 
of the economy that the New Deal and later efforts sought to concen-
trate in the executive branch of government. The ameliorative premises 
are subsidies that help relieve economic distress or social-insurance pro-
grams that help protect individuals against the sharp edges of economic 
life. It was the administrative, not the ameliorative, elements of the New 
Deal that deranged the Philadelphia regime — the set of constitutional 
and political arrangements the framers enacted in 1787.
Of course, both the administrative and ameliorative parts of the New 
Deal can be either defended or disputed. Each of them affects the size 
and scope of government. But the administrative parts are the ones that 
change the Constitution’s character by altering the balance of powers 
both within the national government and between the national and 
state governments. Ameliorative government — government that seeks 
to assure a basic level of economic sufficiency for its people — can, to 
be sure, bleed into administrative government. This happens when the 
state attempts not just to relieve poverty but to eradicate it by reaching 
into individuals’ lives and dictating the details. But the latter was the 
aspiration of the Great Society, not the New Deal. The New Deal’s pro-
grams of economic relief were vastly simpler and more transparent than 
those of the Great Society.
Nothing about ameliorative government inherently necessitates 
administrative government. If these elements of the New Deal can be 
detached from each other, there will still be arguments over anti-poverty 
policy and social insurance. But there might be broader acceptance of 
the constitutional legitimacy of the New Deal legacies that everyone ac-
cepts on policy grounds. Such a constitutional détente would be based 
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on core principles that would make a welfare state compatible with the 
Philadelphia regime. Constitutionally, a welfare state must be general: 
provided across the board rather than to favored individuals or regions. It 
must be simple: both transparent and visible to the public. And, finally, 
it must be based on a preference, but not a dogma, for local government. 
Agreement on these points can forge a constitutional consensus that 
leaves the vital question of generosity open to ongoing policy dispute.
the new Deals
Historians speak of at least two New Deals. The first consisted of the 
spate of administrative authority concentrated in the national govern-
ment in Roosevelt’s “first 100 days” legislation. It included regulatory 
laws like the Agricultural Adjustment Act and the National Industrial 
Recovery Act, both of which gave the executive branch a sweeping array 
of new economic powers, as well as Keynesian-inspired measures like 
the Public Works Administration and the Civilian Conservation Corps.
Broadly speaking, the First New Deal encapsulated the New Deal’s 
administrative premises. It would be too much to say the First New Deal 
sought a fully planned economy, but it certainly welcomed a larger role 
for public planning. The executive branch was given the authority to 
dictate prices of commodities, levels of wages and prices, amounts of 
production, and, in the case of the agricultural law, even rates of taxa-
tion. Initially, the Supreme Court invalidated these new powers in cases 
like 1935’s Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States. But, starting in 
1937, the Court began clearing the way for many of them in West Coast 
Hotel v. Parrish and never looked back.
These new regulatory powers arguably did derange, in the literal 
sense, the Constitution. They meant that legislative and executive au-
thority, and often judicial too, were wielded by a single hand — what 
Madison had called “the very definition of tyranny” in Federalist No. 47. 
Moreover, they inserted the national government into the daily life of 
the nation for the first time. There may be much to commend this regu-
latory authority. The point here is that it transformed the constitutional 
regime not just by expanding the authority of the national government, 
but by concentrating it in the executive branch in violation of the prin-
ciple of separation of powers.
The ameliorative principles of the New Deal were different. 
Originating in the so-called Second New Deal, they were unveiled in 
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President Roosevelt’s January 1935 State of the Union address, in which 
he called for moving from “recovery” to “reform,” taking the shape of 
three priorities: the “security of a livelihood,” to be achieved through 
a major jobs program; the “security against the major hazards 
and vicissitudes of life,” pursued through old-age and unemployment 
insurance and a national system of welfare relief; and “the security 
of decent homes.” The second of these, the apparatus of social insur-
ance, laid the ameliorative foundations of the New Deal regime: Social 
Security, unemployment insurance, and Aid to Dependent Children 
(later AFDC).
Arthur Schlesinger described a conscious decision, in deference to 
conservative congressional opposition as well as judicial obstacles to 
economic planning, to utilize the taxing and spending power rather 
than the regulatory powers of the national government in the Second 
New Deal. Walter Lippmann thus distinguished between a “Directed” 
and a “Compensated” Economy. This “Compensated Economy,” which 
allowed free markets to operate but insured individuals against what 
Roosevelt had called the market’s “hazards and vicissitudes,” formed the 
New Deal’s ameliorative core.
Constitutional authoRities
The question is whether such a welfare state is compatible with the 
Philadelphia Constitution’s limitation of congressional powers to the 18 
enumerated in Article I. A familiar tale holds that, at the peak of judicial 
hostility to the New Deal, Labor Secretary Frances Perkins confided her 
concern about the courts’ reception of the forthcoming Social Security 
bill to Justice Harlan Fiske Stone. Accounts of his reaction vary. According 
to one, he replied, “The spending power, my dear, the spending power is 
all you need.” The other version casts his reply in terms of the “taxing” 
power: “You can do anything under the taxing power.” The distinction 
matters, and the roots of the dispute run far deeper than the New Deal.
The debate over the nature of the national government’s authority to 
tax and spend reaches back at least to Hamilton and Madison. Congress’s 
first enumerated power in Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution reads 
as follows: “The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, 
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the com-
mon Defence and general Welfare of the United States.” The question 
of whether this clause indicates either a power to tax and spend distinct 
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from the enumerated powers that follow — or whether the spending 
power was limited by the subsequent enumerated powers — remained 
a point of controversy from the founding period to the New Deal. 
According to one side of the argument, Congress possessed sweep-
ing powers to tax for the general welfare and to spend for the general 
welfare; these were substantive, additional grants of power beyond the 
remaining enumerated powers. On the other side, the reference to “pro-
viding for” the common defense and general welfare — the spending 
prong of the clause — merely indicated the purpose of taxation; conse-
quently, the enumeration of powers that followed limited the spending 
power. Both sides, however, emphasized the generality of spending as a 
constitutional limitation.
Since social insurance in the New Deal model would find its clear-
est constitutional authority in this “general welfare” clause, the issue 
requires careful attention. Does the general welfare clause give Congress 
an additional power to tax and spend to meet the country’s needs, or 
must an authority for economic relief be found elsewhere in the enu-
merated powers?
Gordon Lloyd observes in his edition of Madison’s Debates in the 
Federal Convention of 1787 that “common defence and general welfare” 
first appears in the deliberations of the Philadelphia convention in the 
August 21st Report of the Committee of 11 as a qualification of the power 
to incur debts: They could be incurred only for the common defense and 
general welfare rather than for particular or local purposes. Generality 
was unquestionably a minimal requirement of the constitutionality of 
taxing and spending; it was one argument made, for example, against 
federal relief for the Savannah fire of 1796. Representative John Nicholas 
of Virginia thus complained in the debate on relief for the fire that “[if] 
the general welfare was to be extended (as it had been insinuated it 
ought) to objects of charity, it was undefined indeed.”
This much — that spending must be general rather than particu-
lar — was uncontroversial. But was this the only limitation on the 
spending power? Hamilton argued as much in his opinion on the con-
stitutionality of the National Bank:
Congress can be considered as under only one restriction which 
does not apply to other governments — they cannot rightfully ap-
ply the money they raise to any purpose merely or purely local.
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But, with this exception, they have as large a discretion in rela-
tion to the application of money as any Legislature whatever. The 
constitutional test of a right application must always be, whether 
it be for a purpose of general or local nature. If the former, there 
can be no want of constitutional power.
Similarly, in his Report on Manufactures, Hamilton described the spend-
ing power as sweeping:
[T]he power to raise money is plenary, and indefinite; and the 
objects to which it may be appropriated are no less comprehen-
sive, than the payment of the public debts and the providing 
for the common defence and “general Welfare.” The terms “gen-
eral Welfare” were doubtless intended to signify more than was 
expressed or imported in those which Preceded; otherwise nu-
merous exigencies incident to the affairs of a Nation would have 
been left without a provision. The phrase is as comprehensive as 
any that could have been used.
Madison objected vehemently to this interpretation. He surely wished he 
could have unmasked Hamilton as his partner in writing the Federalist 
Papers, for Federalist No. 41 — one of Madison’s numbers — had dis-
missed concerns about the general-welfare clause on the grounds that 
the subsequent enumeration limited it: “[W]hat color can the objection 
have, when a specification of the objects alluded to by these general 
terms, immediately follows, and is not even separated by a longer pause 
than a semicolon?” Debating about the Bank in the First Congress, he 
persisted in this analysis: “No argument could be drawn from the terms 
‘common defence, and general welfare.’ The power as to these general 
purposes, was limited to acts laying taxes for them; and the general 
purposes themselves were limited and explained by the particular enu-
meration subjoined.” 
In other words, an authority not otherwise specified in Article I, 
Section 8, could not be considered as part of the “general welfare” for 
purposes of the taxing and spending power. Madison continued to press 
this point as late as 1817 when, in his last act as president, he vetoed an 
internal-improvements bill. Authorizing local improvements under the 
general-welfare clause would render, as Madison wrote,
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the special and careful enumeration of powers which follow the 
clause nugatory and improper. Such a view of the Constitution 
would have the effect of giving to Congress a general power of 
Legislation instead of the defined and limited one hitherto under-
stood to belong to them, the terms “common defense and general 
welfare” embracing every object and act within the purview of a 
legislative trust.
Justice Joseph Story’s Commentaries entered this debate on Hamilton’s 
side, concluding, based on the grammar of the clause as well as the 
settled practice of the national government, that the “common” defense 
and “general” welfare — and not the enumerated powers — were the 
only limit on the spending authority. The government could appropri-
ate funds “to any purposes, or in any manner, conducive to those ends.”
This debate remained judicially unresolved until 1936’s United States 
v. Butler. Significantly, the decision was issued by a conservative Supreme 
Court that was still striking down the New Deal — including in this 
case, which overturned the Agricultural Adjustment Act. But in the 
course of doing so, Justice Owen Roberts — who would later provide 
the “switch in time that saved nine” in West Coast Hotel — established 
for the first time the judicial doctrine that the only limit on the taxing 
and spending power was the requirement of generality. He cited Story 
as the relevant authority, writing:
While . . . the power to tax is not unlimited, its confines are set in 
the clause which confers it, and not in those of §8 which bestow 
and define the legislative powers of the Congress. It results that 
the power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys 
for public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative 
power found in the Constitution.
In Helvering v. Davis, Justice Benjamin Cardozo, upholding Social 
Security, further clarified that the judgment of whether an exercise of 
the welfare power was general or particular was up to Congress unless 
its “choice [was] clearly wrong.” Taken together, this is the general tax-
ing and spending authority under which Chief Justice John Roberts 
would, three-quarters of a century later, find the individual mandate of 
the Affordable Care Act constitutional in NFIB v. Sebelius: “Put simply, 
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Congress may tax and spend. This grant gives the Federal Government 
considerable influence even in areas where it cannot directly regulate.”
Clearly there is room for reasonable debate between the 
Hamiltonian and Madisonian positions. But it seems equally clear that 
the Hamiltonian reading is a faithful one with theoretical roots and 
sustained practice. Would, then, a Hamiltonian reading license social 
insurance on the model of Social Security, unemployment compensa-
tion, or welfare benefits? Put otherwise, does such an approach tax and 
spend for the general rather than the particular welfare? 
Unquestionably such a regime would have exceeded Hamilton’s 
imagination. But it is probably more general and less particular than 
the industrial inducements he proposed in the Report on Manufactures. 
Moreover, today’s economic benefits are general insofar as they are avail-
able to all and hence insure the population as a whole against Roosevelt’s 
“hazards and vicissitudes” of life. Even those who do not receive financial 
benefits from these programs nonetheless benefit because social insur-
ance is in place. The knowledge that individuals are insured against the 
worst economic outcomes gives, or at least can give, policymakers the 
confidence to step out of the way of more aggressive economic growth. It 
gives individuals the confidence to take economic risks. It provides peace 
of mind in the same way other forms of insurance do.
This is not to say all programs of social insurance are fiscally pru-
dent or demographically sustainable. Nor is it to say Hamilton would 
have endorsed them. It is merely to say they are compatible in principle 
with a reasonable Hamiltonian reading of the general welfare clause. 
But certain criteria must be met if such programs are to comport more 
broadly with the tenor of the regime to which the framers agreed in 
Philadelphia in 1787.
Constitutional pRemises
The first criterion a constitutional welfare state must meet, as authorities 
from Hamilton to Story to Roberts have already indicated, is generality: 
It must apply broadly, not to favored regions, groups, or individuals. 
This does not mean, again, that everyone must receive benefits. The 
point, rather, is that benefits should be provided according to the prin-
ciple of social insurance and allotted by broad formulas rather than 
being targeted to favored classes. Social Security is the classic example. 
While the program taxes all workers for the benefit of a defined class 
N ational Affairs  ·  Fall 2016
136
of recipients, all taxpayers anticipate joining that class. Programs like 
unemployment insurance or welfare benefits operate on a similar prin-
ciple: They provide benefits to groups that all taxpayers could reasonably 
anticipate joining, including because of adverse circumstances beyond 
their control.
However, the national approach to economic relief shifted between 
the New Deal and the Great Society, with Lyndon Johnson’s War on 
Poverty assuming a more ambitious and, with it, more detailed posture. 
In The End of Liberalism, Theodore Lowi describes a deliberate rejection 
of the strategy of alleviating poverty — the New Deal approach — in 
favor of a strategy of eliminating it. He thus distinguishes between 
“old” and “new” welfare, with Social Security typifying the “old” strain 
and the Community Action Programs of the 1960s — based on grants 
to community organizations rather than formulas for aid available to 
families that met certain criteria — epitomizing the newer kind. (One 
enduring result of this approach is the more than 80 anti-poverty pro-
grams that Speaker Ryan’s report observed lingering even 20 years after 
welfare reform.) 
Poverty could have been alleviated merely by making old welfare more 
generous, Lowi notes. But he summarizes the contrary disposition of the 
new poverty warriors: “Alleviation was for sissies.” Irving Kristol’s prin-
ciples of neoconservatism similarly accepted the idea of a welfare state but 
rejected the bureaucratization and paternalism of its Great Society vari-
ant. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, too, distinguished between the generality 
of New Deal liberalism and the Great Society’s ambition to micromanage 
society. As Moynihan often emphasized, the New Deal involved govern-
ment in what it did best — collecting revenue and cutting checks — and 
to stunning success. Social Security, for example, rapidly transformed the 
poorest demographic cohort of the population into the wealthiest.
This simplicity is the next criterion a welfare state must meet to com-
port with the Constitution. George Carey has emphasized that Federalist 
No. 10 seems to presume “a low-key or relatively passive government”:
If it were otherwise, the problems of controlling the effects of 
faction would go well beyond those canvassed by Madison. A pos-
itive government would, more likely than not, serve to arouse the 
people; and, to the extent that it became the mechanism through 
which interests, factious or not, could achieve differential and 
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favored treatment, it would increasingly become the object of 
capture or domination. Scarcely any interest could avoid being 
drawn into this political vortex.
Another way of pursuing the same line of argument is that Madison seems 
to presume a relatively simple or transparent regime that can be controlled 
by ordinary political processes. This is implicit in Federalist No. 10’s claim 
that minority factions will be “unable to execute and mask [their] violence 
under the forms of the Constitution.” These groups will instead, Madison 
writes, be defeated by “regular vote.” But what he calls this “republican 
principle” only operates if the public can exert basic control, rooted in es-
sential familiarity with the policies and processes of government.
Excessively complicated and detailed programs turn positive govern-
ment into uncontrollable government. If government does an infinite 
variety of small things, votes cannot be interpreted to make a statement 
on any one of them, even if — as seems unlikely — the average voter can 
be aware of them in the first place. Indeed, since voters can cast only 
one ballot per election while public officials must make hundreds if not 
thousands of decisions, politicians unavoidably get a free pass on most 
issues. This makes the influence of special interests on those affairs cost-
free as well. Crucially, corruption is neither necessary nor adequate to 
explain this phenomenon. The better explanation is government’s seep-
age into ever-smaller nooks and crannies of the economy and society in 
an effort to tease smaller and smaller perfections out of both. Special 
interests lobby where, and because, government operates.
That is ineradicable; the problem arises when it becomes invisible, 
either because government regulates in so many areas that voters cannot 
impose accountability, or because it does so in administrative agencies 
beyond public influence or view. The First New Deal’s administrative 
apparatus and its regulatory descendants have for this reason become 
breeding grounds for minority factions. These factions try to influence 
the distribution of small economic advantages because government de-
termines the distribution of small economic advantages. Dry up the 
breeding ground — in other words, make fewer detailed decisions — and 
the special-interest influence dries up as well.
It is consequently government’s shrinkage — in the size of what it 
discretely undertakes, not its aggregate scope — rather than its over-
all growth that places it beyond the republican controls the founders 
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envisioned. The problem is not government’s size but rather its complex-
ity. That is a problem of the administrative rather than the ameliorative 
aspects of the New Deal.
The old-age benefit of Social Security is a massive program but a 
simple one. It does not attract corruption: One is either retirement age 
or one is not, and benefits are set by objective criteria. Simplicity may 
partly explain the appeal to some conservatives of approaches to eco-
nomic relief like a guaranteed income: Rather than detailing the terms 
of relief, or attempting to micromanage individuals’ lives, they would ex-
pand the principle of social insurance to income generally. Proposals to 
replace the panoply of health-care programs, including the immensely 
complex Affordable Care Act, with subsidies for purchases of insurance 
on the private market operate on a similar principle. In both cases, 
conservatives and liberals can still argue about the appropriate level 
of generosity, but there may be room for consensus on what form best 
comports with the Philadelphia regime. In any event, regardless of the 
program, there is no inherent reason a positive state that undertakes 
a small number of transparent and simple efforts toward economic 
relief — even if very large ones — cannot square itself with the founding.
Finally, the Constitution prefers that government be as local as pos-
sible, what Catholic social teaching would later call “subsidiarity,” the 
ethical principle that a problem should be addressed by the competent 
social institution closest to the individual. As Thomas West notes, it is 
a myth that relief efforts at the time of the founding were purely chari-
table as opposed to public. Government did play a role, it simply did so 
parsimoniously to avoid dependence and locally in order to maintain 
face-to-face connections based on genuine knowledge of individuals’ 
varying needs. In his Notes on the State of Virginia, Jefferson reports 
that “all our states” had laws providing for maintenance of the poor — 
including paying stipends to farmers for boarding them and establish-
ing workhouses with compulsory labor for “vagabonds” — such that 
“from Savannah to Portsmouth you will seldom meet a beggar.”
However, this preference for locality is just that — a preference. It is 
not a dogma. It is prudential, not constitutional. Federalist No. 45 explic-
itly declines to elevate federalism to sacramental status:
Was, then, the American Revolution effected, was the American 
confederacy formed, was the precious blood of thousands spilt, 
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and the hard-earned substance of millions lavished, not that the 
people of America should enjoy peace, liberty, and safety, but that 
the governments of the individual States . . . might enjoy a certain 
extent of power?
Similarly, Federalist No. 46 characterizes the level of government at 
which a given activity will be undertaken as something to be sorted out 
based on voters’ perceptions of competence. “[T]he people,” Madison 
writes there, “ought not surely to be precluded from giving most of their 
confidence where they may discover it to be most due.”
Such passages do not undermine the framers’ commitment to feder-
alism. They do, however, suggest it was more of a prudential preference 
than an inflexible abstraction. Put otherwise, the framers were will-
ing to undertake national efforts when circumstances warranted them. 
If contemporary macroeconomic conditions warrant a national safety 
net — say, to facilitate mobility or to prevent a “race to the bottom” be-
tween localities — nothing about the principle of federalism or, for that 
matter, subsidiarity inherently inhibits it.
Aid to Families with Dependent Children represented a hybrid 
model by which the federal government guaranteed benefits that var-
ied by state. The current program — Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families — continues a federal financial commitment but with more 
state flexibility: still a partnership, but not a guarantee. People can dis-
agree. They do. Creative compromises, such as federal benefits with 
local experimentation, can be struck. But these are prudential questions, 
not constitutional ones.
Constitutional amelioR ation
Ameliorative government as expressed in the Second New Deal more 
or less complies with these criteria — generality, simplicity, and, insofar 
as its solutions are necessarily national, locality. However, if the forego-
ing analysis is persuasive, it also suggests the constitutional status of the 
New Deal depends on severing its administrative from its ameliorative 
elements. Put another way, the relevant issue is less the scope of gov-
ernment (which the ameliorative state expands) than the structure of 
government (which the administrative state deranges).
The founders provided a basis for such a distinction. Federalist No. 
31 draws it: “[A]ll observations founded upon the danger of usurpation 
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ought to be referred to the composition and structure of the govern-
ment, not to the nature and extent of its powers.” That is, a government 
that is properly balanced internally — that distributes powers between 
branches rather than concentrating them — can be trusted with the 
powers it needs. This separation of powers was the reason Federalist 
No. 84 could say the Constitution was itself a Bill of Rights.
The administrative state is fundamentally hostile to the separation of 
powers, and it is consequently the combination of administrative and 
ameliorative government that threatens the Philadelphia regime, not the 
welfare state itself. Curbing the administrative state does not, to be sure, 
mean abandoning necessary regulations in areas from the environment 
to financial markets. But faithfulness to the Constitution does require 
subjecting them to the separation of powers.
Perhaps most clearly, to the extent fewer regulations mean more risk 
but fewer administrative burdens also mean more growth, the pres-
ence of an underlying welfare state would make that gamble rational. 
Severing the administrative and ameliorative premises of the New 
Deal thus represents a bargain: The individual accepts more fluctua-
tion — more “creative destruction,” in Schumpeter’s phrase — with its 
attendant risks, on the knowledge that he is insured against it.
Conversely, the proper balancing of powers may also make the 
centralization of authority, to the degree it is genuinely necessary, less 
threatening than orthodox constitutionalists have generally supposed it 
to be. That is, the danger to constitutionalism is not merely the extent 
to which authority is concentrated at the national level of government, 
but the extent to which it is concentrated within the national level. The 
dispersal of power makes an otherwise necessary allocation of power to 
the national government safer.
A constitutionalist’s version of the New Deal — or a New Dealer’s 
constitutionalism — then, would consist of a program of simply con-
structed social insurance rooted in the general-welfare clause and a 
regulatory apparatus that is both closely tailored to actual needs and 
subject to the separation of powers. To this, Hamilton might not object. 
Nor, for that matter, might Madison.
maDison’s  metabolism
Thus far, this analysis has grounded a constitutional image of the New 
Deal in a Hamiltonian reading of the general-welfare clause. But there 
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is another foundation on which to erect it: Madison’s theory of con-
stitutional change. Explaining his 1815 decision to regard the Second 
Bank of the United States as constitutional after years of arguing the 
opposite, Madison elaborated a theory of measured constitutional 
change — what I have elsewhere called “a living constitution with a slow 
metabolism” — whereby that which persistent, generational majorities 
have regarded as constitutional through all three branches of govern-
ment must be regarded as such, even by those who disagree.
While Madison vetoed the bank on prudential grounds, his message 
to Congress said he felt further constitutional disputation was precluded 
“by repeated recognitions under varied circumstances of the validity 
of such an institution in acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches of the Government, accompanied by indications, in different 
modes of a concurrence of the general will of the nation.”
The time horizon to which Madison referred — over which the con-
stitutional consensus he alleged had supposedly endured — was roughly 
a single generation. At least three generations have passed — more than 
a third of American constitutional history — since the New Deal, and 
arguably with far less ongoing disputation than the bank received. That 
is not to say the New Deal has been ratified in all its particulars; on the 
contrary, the analysis above suggests citizens could scarcely have been 
aware of, much less have consented to, all the details. It is instead to 
say the basic idea that the government has a prominent role to play in 
economic security is broadly unchallenged.
If persistent practice and understanding can render even a mis-
taken understanding of our founding as constitutional, it would seem 
that moment has arrived with respect to the welfare state. Quite argu-
ably, in the particular task of alleviating distress if not of transforming 
society — which was never the Second New Deal’s goal — it has worked. 
The task now is not to unravel ameliorative government, which no one 
in the mainstream of politics seeks, but rather to render it constitutional. 
That begins with understanding its distinction from administrative gov-
ernment, and the constitutional possibility of embracing one without 
accepting the other.
